Strengthening executive constraints is one of the key means of improving political governance. This paper argues that resilient leaders who face a lower probability of being replaced are less likely to reform institutions which constrain their power. We test this idea empirically using data on leaders since 1875 using two proxies of resilience: whether a leader survives to die in o¢ ce and whether there are recent natural disasters during the leader's tenure. We show that both are associated with lower rates of leader turnover and a lower probability of a transition to strong executive constraints. This e¤ect is robust across a wide range of speci…cations. Moreover, in line with the theory, it is speci…c to strengthening executive constraints rather than generalized political reform.
Introduction
Creating stable systems of government where citizens enjoy political rights and rulers are constrained has been a major achievement in human history. Figure 1 gives a birds' eye view of this achievement by plotting the worldwide prevalence of strong executive constraints, which circumscribe the power of leaders in o¢ ce, using data from Polity IV. 1 The red line illustrates this evolution across the 50 countries for which we have uninterrupted data from 1875 to 2004. The main variations broadly follow Huntington's three waves of democratization (Huntington, 1991) . They re ‡ect reforms in Europe at the beginning of the past century, a setback in the interwar period, followed by a return of strong constraints after World War II, and then a surge of institutional reforms in Latin America and the former Communist block from the 1980s onward. The blue line shows the prevalence for all countries with available data. 2 Although the proportion of countries with strong executive constraints is considerably lower at the end of the sample in this larger group, the pattern looks broadly similar with the exception of an additional dip from 1960 to 1975 driven by a number of newly established countries (mainly former colonies).
The reasons for the adoption of such constraints are not well understood. However, leaders who are secure in their hold on power will typically have weak motives to pursue reforms that limit their discretionary authority. This pattern has indeed been common among monarchs and autocrats with few or no formal checks on their power. In one of the most famous historical examples, King John felt compelled to sign Magna Carta in 1215, but only when his power was threatened by the barons on whom he relied for support. This seems to suggest a more general and compelling argument: leaders with strong survival prospects are less likely to accept reforms which constrain executive authority. We refer to such leaders as having high resilience.
Against this background, our paper studies how resilient leaders may constitute a barrier to reform towards strong executive constraints theoretically and empirically. We formulate a simple model, which predicts that leader resilience reduces the incentive to adopt strong executive constraints by reducing the prospect that a ruling group loses o¢ ce. 3 This component from the theory receives support from a …rst pass at the data. Raw leadership turnover is positively correlated with the adoption of stronger executive constraints. Conditional on country and year …xed e¤ects, such reforms are about 9 percentage points more likely in the …ve years after a leadership transition than in the …ve years before the transition, a di¤erence which is statistically signi…cant. But more satisfactory evidence for our general idea requires exogenous measures of leader resilience.
We consider two di¤erent measures of leader resilience. The …rst comes from observing which leaders die in o¢ ce from natural causes. Arguably, leaders who hold on to power until they die are inherently more resilient in the sense of our model. Moreover, we show that the tenure of such leaders is much longer than for other leaders -in our full sample, they stay in o¢ ce four years longer. 4 Institutional reform when a resilient leader leaves o¢ ce is then motivated by the di¢ culty that an incumbent elite group may have in …nding an equally resilient successor to the deceased leader, a di¢ culty that reduces its probability of remaining in power.
Our second measure of leader resilience is based on events during the leader's tenure. It is motivated by the famous "rally-around-the- ‡ag e¤ect", which is often associated with wars and domestic emergencies. Famous examples in recent history include how Margaret Thatcher turned around extremely negative polling …gures when she resisted Argentina's invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and how George W. Bush gained popularity following the 9/11 attacks. Arguably, natural disasters provide more generic, measurable and empirically robust examples of this e¤ect, as they cannot be manipulated in the same way as foreign con ‡icts. Indeed, a key …nding of the paper is that natural disasters are robustly negatively correlated with political turnover. That is, leaders in o¢ ce after such events tend to survive longer, which means they become more resilient in the wake of such events. Our paper speaks to debates about the link between democracy and development. Early studies were in ‡uenced by the modernization hypothesis of Lipset (1959) , with more recent incarnations being Przeworski et al (2000) and Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) . However, the hypothesis that income drives democracy receives weak empirical support with, at best, ambiguous evidence -see, for example, Barro (1999) , Acemoglu et al (2008) , and Bruckner and Ciccione (2011) . This …nding is consistent with our approach. The timing of political change is often idiosyncratic and linked to political circumstance rather than to slow moving variables like income or education, even though these variables may shape the wider context and citizens'aspirations.
By focusing on characteristics of leaders, our approach is distinct from a strand of literature on how social and cultural factors may promote democracy. This includes the ideas that having a strong and e¤ective middle class or plentiful social capital may be important, as hypothesized, for example, by Almond and Verba (1963), Moore (1966) , and Putnam (1993) . In this general vein, Persson and Tabellini (2009) introduce the concept of democratic capital and …nd empirically that this consolidates rather than promotes transitions into democracy.
The ambition of our paper is to study a speci…c dimension of political reform. Although we focus on strengthening executive constraints, it has most in common with the literature on franchise extension, particularly the work by Robinson (2000, 2006) , who o¤er insightful case-study evidence. They also emphasize the role of political instability, particularly due to the threat of a revolution. Franchise extension is used a commitment device by the elite to guarantee more favorable treatment of the masses. Aidt and Jensen (2010) …nd econometric evidence in support of this view. Below, we show that having a leader who dies in o¢ ce does not predict changes in the franchise nor other moves towards greater openness.
Our argument is also related to that in Lizzeri and Persico (2004) , where a ruling group voluntarily extends the franchise in order to reorient spending from transfers targeted to small groups to broad-based programs. It also resembles a classic argument …rst made by Rokkan (1970) and extended by Boix (1999) . This holds that fears of electoral losses explain the move from plurality to proportional representation as a means of protecting the center-right from a labor electoral landslide in those countries in early 20th-century Europe where landed and industrial elites had not forged their interests.
In a di¤erent vein, Laguno¤ (2001) develops a model with a dynamic game between two groups, in which greater political turnover leads to greater constitutional support for civil liberties. Congleton (2007) discusses forces that promote the introduction of parliamentary oversight on royal power, focusing on instability due to preference shocks to the monarch. Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik (2011) develop a model of endogenous checks and balances, stressing the way that these change the ability of special interests to in ‡uence policy. Jones and Olken (2009) exploits the di¤erence between successful and unsuccessful assassination attempts to show that random leadership change leads to democratic reform, as measured by a broad democracy index.
In summary, our approach is one where institutional reform is "defensive" and undertaken when a leader and/or his group anticipates losing political power. This is di¤erent from the Acemoglu-Robinson approach, where institutional reforms are also defensive, but the incumbent group gives up political power in order to secure economic power. Our approach also di¤ers from those based on revolutionary change, where institutional change is "o¤ensive"and an incumbent is removed from power as a means of securing change. Of course, all these approaches have their counterparts in the real world. Our aim is to explore the theoretical and empirical validity of one particular approach, rather than trying to provide a general account of all aspects of institutional change.
In the next section of the paper, we set the stage by providing a case-study account of Spain under Franco and the political reforms that followed after his death.
Section 3 develops a simple in…nite-horizon model, where an incumbent group that faces high expected turnover may choose to reform by putting in place more binding executive constraints. Given that leaders have di¤erent survival probabilities, the model makes a speci…c empirical prediction: leaders with greater resilience -and hence lower expected turnover -are less likely to carry out reforms towards stronger executive constraints.
In Section 4, we discuss how to take the model to the data. The model suggests a reducedform relation, where the probability of a transitions to/from weak executive constraints depends on leader resilience. As mentioned above, we measure resilience in two ways: whether a leader (eventually) dies in o¢ ce from natural causes, and whether s/he experiences a natural disaster while in o¢ ce. Underlying this reduced form, is a more structural Instrumental Variables (IV) approach in line with the model. In the …rst stage, our two measures of resilience are used to instrument for expected leader turnover, conditional on leader age and tenure. In the second stage, higher predicted turnover induces a greater probability of higher constraints on the executive.
Section 5 presents our empirical results. Our baseline estimates are consistent with the predictions of the model. They suggest that having a leader who later dies in o¢ ce and/or has experienced a natural disaster in the last two years in o¢ ce lowers the probability of a transition from weak to strong executive constraints by about 3-5 percentage points per year. While we see similar reductions in turnover with more resilient leaders in countries which already have strong executive constraints, there is no relation between lower turnover and switches towards weak executive constraints -i.e., our main …nding is asymmetric. We show that these results are robust to a number of concerns about the exclusion restriction that underlies our IV-approach. For example, the results hold up when we control for a number of personal characteristics of leaders, as well as the economic and political context at the time the leader entered into o¢ ce. Section 6 relates this paper to wider forms of democratic reform, speci…cally increases in openness -like extensions of the franchise -that create more contestable power structures. We show how the model can be extend to encompass this aspect of reform. But, empirically, leader resilience does not seem to predict reforms towards greater openness. Thus, our results are speci…c to reforms of executive constraints and not driven by general democratizations. Section 7 concludes the paper. Some details of the theory and the data are relegated to an Appendix.
Motivating Case Study: Francisco Franco

5
Francisco Franco was an archetypal example of a resilient leader in terms of our theory. A victorious war hero, he ruled Spain under unchecked authoritarian rule after the end of the civil war. According to the Law of Succession from 1947, Spain would return to monarchy, but Franco would rule for life and himself appoint the next King. The unelected Spanish pseudo-parliament, the Cortes, was at best an advisory body with no right to initiate legislation or oppose the government. It was dominated by the so-called National Movement -the Movimiento -which constituted the political elite. The Movimiento comprised a collection of right-wing families and was the only recognized forum for political participation. No elections were held during the Franco period.
Some modest reforms in 1966 separated the functions of head of state and head of government, but the authoritarian character of the regime remained intact. The hard-line Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco was appointed the …rst prime minister and was also widely expected to become Franco's successor, even though Franco had already appointed Juan Carlos as the next head of state in 1969. Juan Carlos, the son of Spain's legitimate monarch Juan of Bourbon, was generally considered an insider of the ruling elite, by which he had been educated and groomed. As a quid pro quo for the appointment, Juan Carlos swore to be faithful to the National Movement. Thus, he publicly supported the regime and took part in ceremonial functions together with Franco.
From the late 1960s, the regime saw increasing challenges from an emerging political opposition, including regional-autonomy movements in the Basque country, Catalonia, and (less so) Galicia. In particular, ETA -the Basque revolutionary liberation army -started to systematically implement the theory of action/terror/action to further its independence cause; most signi…cantly, ETA assassinated Carrero Blanco in December 1973. The regime countered the opposition with higher levels of repression. Meanwhile, the ailing Franco replaced Carrero Blanco as Prime Minister with another hardliner, Arias Navarro. Despite the mounting opposition, there was little to suggest an end to the unchecked authoritarian regime. For the postwar period up until the year of 1974, Polity IV sets the executive constraints variable for Spain at the bottom score of 1 (on a scale from 1 to 7).
In November of 1975, Franco died in o¢ ce of heart disease. At this time, no similarly resilient leader was waiting to take over. Although the Cortes proclaimed Juan Carlos King of Spain, it rea¢ rmed Navarro as prime minister. The latter made vague proposals of limited reforms. When these were met with public demonstrations, strikes and increased regional terrorist acts, the regime responded with increased repression. Following discontent with Navarro's handling of the situation, the King asked for him to step down in the summer of 1976. He replaced Navarro with another leading …gure from the Movimiento, its general secretary and former Franco minister, Adolfo Suarez Gonzales.
Despite expectations to the contrary, Suarez -with outright support of the King -saw the need for more far-reaching reforms, to avoid descent into a spiral of repression and violence. He soon announced plans for a comprehensive package of political reform, which would put in place a constitutional monarchy based on parliamentary democracy with a bicameral legislature. In the fall of 1976, he managed to convince the Movimiento members of the Cortes that the only way forward was to accept this reform package, which e¤ectively would dismantle the institution itself. Later in that fall, the Spanish people approved the plans with a majority of 88% in a national referendum. New laws permitting political parties, including the Communist Party, were passed by the Cortes in the spring of 1977, and general elections to a new legislature were held in the summer of the same year, using proportional representation.
In these elections, Suarez ran as the party leader of the newly founded UCD at the conservativecenter of politics, which emerged as the largest party followed by the PSOE (the Socialist Party). The most polarized parties, the Alianza Popular (on the far right, picking up the heritage from the dissolved Movimiento) and the Communist Party, each polled at about 10%. The new parliament elected a seven-member constitutional committee representing all major parties to draft Spain's new constitution. The committee's proposal was amended and eventually passed by parliament in October 1978, and approved in a general referendum in December of the same year. After this, Suarez dissolved the parliament and called for new elections under the new constitution.
A mere three years after Franco's death, Suarez and Juan Carlos, two members of the former ruling elite, had thus led the country through a remarkably peaceful democratic transition. In this process, Spain adopted a constitution with a number of horizontal checks and balances, as well as provisions for regional autonomy. The new political regime has endured since those daysits resilience was tested most dramatically in a failed coup attempt in February 1981 by Colonel Antonio Tejero, who together with 200 armed members of the paramilitary police (the Guardia Civil) stormed into the Chamber of Deputies to interrupt its election of the new prime minister. From the year of 1978, Polity IV codes Spain's executive constraints with the top score of 7 (on the 1 to 7 scale).
The example of Spain illustrates two key points relevant to the paper. First, Franco faced no e¤ective opposition while alive -the fact that he died in o¢ ce is indicative of his resilience as a leader. Second, following his departure, no comparable resilient leader was waiting in the wings to take over. The fact that subsequent leaders of the ruling group were likely to face a more contestable position led to a move towards cohesive institutions.
Model
Our model is a threefold extension of the two-period, two-group, one-actor model sketched in Besley and Persson (2011a, Ch. 7) to an in…nite-horizon, multiple-group setting, which explicitly distinguishes groups and their leaders. The incumbent government in power decides how to deploy a …xed tax revenue between transfers and public goods, being more or less constrained by current political institutions. In view of their prospect of surviving in o¢ ce, incumbent groups choose the cohesiveness of political institutions (executive constraints) for the next period.
Basics and groups
There is an in…nite horizon with time periods denoted by t = 1; 2; :::. The population is normalized to unity and divided into t . Variable g t is the provision of public goods by the incumbent. The value of public goods is given by ; with 1 < < where b t are the per-capita rents, extracted by the period-t leader on behalf of his group -these rents could be generated endogenously through predatory activities, as in Besley and Persson (2011a, Ch. 3) . Thus, all members of the incumbent group get the same share of rents.
Everybody discounts the future with discount factor 2 (0; 1). There are no savings in the model.
Government budget constraint
The incumbent leader has access to some exogenous revenue of size T: This income can be spent on three items: public goods g t ; transfers to members of all other groups s t ; and transfers to members of the incumbent group b t :
The government budget constraint is therefore
Within-group leader turnover In each period t, the incumbent group I t starts out with a speci…c leader in power. We use r t 1 2 [r L ; r H ] to denote a leader's "resilience". In the data, we will use to variables to represent this (i) leaders that will eventually die in o¢ ce and (ii) leaders that have recently experienced a natural disaster; we show that these variables predict lower turnover. Higher resilience positively a¤ects two things: (i) the likelihood that the leader will remain as the leader of the incumbent group, and (ii) the incumbent group's probability of staying in power. Let z (r t 1 ; t ) (2 f0; 1g) denote the event that a leader with resilience r t 1 survives as leader of the incumbent group in period t; where is a random shock including death. We assume that z (r t 1 ; t ) is increasing in r, i.e., more resilient leaders are less likely to lose the leadership of their group.
If a leader is replaced within the incumbent group, there is a random draw from the pool of potential leaders with mean resilience r. Thus, the evolution of expected leader resilience conditional on is given by:
We use z (r) = E v fz (r; v)g to denote expected within-group turnover for a leader of resilience r.
Turnover between groups The probability that the incumbent group remains in power until the next period also depends on its current leader. Denoting this ex post (conditional) probability by q t ; we assume that it is simply equal to its leader's resilience:
Before the realization of the random shock t ; the ex ante (unconditional) probability that the incumbent group survives in power when the resilience of the leader is r t 1 is given by
which we assume is increasing in r. 6 A su¢ cient condition for this is that:
Once the random shock, t , is realized and the resilience of the leader is determined, then the probability that the period-t incumbent group loses his/her power at the end of the period is thus 1 q t = 1 r t : If the incumbent group loses power, each opposition group has an equal probability to take over: If a new group enters into power, the leader of that group (with resilience drawn at random) becomes the new leader of the country.
Political institutions Political institutions can be more or less cohesive and are modeled as a constraint on how badly an incumbent group can treat the other groups in the population. In terms of the model, this constrains the rents that an incumbent group can extract at the expense of others in society. Thus, we assume that the incumbent leader must give a …xed share, 0 t 1; to every other citizen, for any unit of rents collected by members of its own group:
The parameter t indexes cohesiveness with a higher value of representing tighter executive constraints on the incumbent government, i.e., a form of institutional commitment. Concretely, this could represent stronger constitutional provisions limiting executive powers, which are enforced by a legislature and/or an independent judiciary. To model the process of political reform, we follow the existing literature (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) in assuming limited commitment, with political institutions chosen at time t being binding on decisions at t + 1 (see further discussion below).
Timing To summarize the model laid out above, each period has the following timing:
1. The polity starts period t with an inherited incumbent group I t ; whose leader has resilience r t 1 , and inherited institutions t ; which bind for that period.
2. The incumbent leader chooses policy fg t ; s t ; b t g for the current period, and political institutions, t+1 ; for the next period.
3. Nature determines the period-t political stability shock t . If the incumbent-group leader survives, then his resilience stays constant. If not, then a fresh draw from a pool of leaders determines r t .
4. Group I t is replaced with probability 1 r t : Each opposition group have an equal probability of taking over the executive, namely
. If a new group takes power, the resilience of its leader is chosen at random.
The model is recursive, which allows us to …rst study period t, fg t ; s t ; b t g; taking t as given. We then study the choice of political regime t+1 ; a more involved problem. We look for a Markovperfect equilibrium where the state variables are fr t 1 ; t g. Given our structure, we show that the decision over future institutions does not depend on t . subject to the constraints on rents and transfers, and the government budget constraint. Policies do not depend on and hence we write them solely as a function of . This recursive separability is key to the identi…cation strategy that we pursue below, i.e., it is key that leader characteristics associated with political survival are uncorrelated with policy preferences.
It is easy to see that the two constraints will all be satis…ed with equality: in particular, transfers to opposition group citizens are set to a minimum s t = t b t : The remaining choice is how much to spend on public goods and how much to spend on rents. As utility is linear, the incumbent will always choose a "bang-bang"solution
The incumbent leader either spends all available funds on public goods, or on rents to his own group (and necessary transfers to opposition groups), depending on the executive constraints he faces. Since
, by assumption, all residual spending is on public goods (rents) when is above (below)
: Cohesive institutions, or high executive constraints -i.e., 2 [
; 1] -induce equality in outcomes in each period by guaranteeing that all spending is on public goods rather than transfers.
Choice of institutions The choice of institutions depends on ex-ante political stability, which is fully captured by the resilience of the leader of the incumbent group, r. We can now state the following result, which is proved in the Appendix:
The choice of executive constraints depends on the probability that the incumbent group retains power as follows:^
Thus more resilient leaders are less likely to pick cohesive institutions.
The prediction in Proposition 1 is symmetric across the initial institutions in place at the beginning of the period. Thus, it predicts transitions into or out of cohesive institutions depending on the current value of leader resilience. This mirrors the reality in the data that constraints on the executive move in both directions.
Even though we have allowed for a continuous choice of , the incumbent always pushes the choice of institutions to one corner or another. The value
represents the point at which it becomes optimal to spend on public goods, i.e., institutions are su¢ ciently cohesive. The executive constraints needed to achieve this are lower when public goods are more valuable ( is higher) or the incumbent group is larger (e is larger).
Although we have an in…nite horizon, the trade-o¤ comes down to comparing the e¤ects of changing on the policy in the next period, factoring in the possibility of group turnover. A high probability of losing o¢ ce leads incumbents to choose strong executive constraints. The choice is governed by a simple comparison of bene…ts and costs. The cost of strong constraints to the incumbent group are next period's rents when it remains in o¢ ce. The bene…t is an assurance that next period's spending will be on public goods if the incumbent group is ousted. Since expected group turnover Q (r) in our model depends on the leader's individual resilience, this result ties the characteristics of leaders to the choice of political institutions; a more resilient leader is less likely to choose strong executive constraints.
Discussion of the model
The model has several speci…c features to home in on how leader resilience a¤ects the motive for political reform.
First, we have modeled political control as opportunities for grabbing a disproportionate share of government revenue. But the speci…c way of discriminating against the rest of society is not essential to the core argument. What we require is some policies on which there is a common agreement, while others have bene…ts which are particular to speci…c groups (as in Lizzeri and Persico, 2004) . The latter could include non-economic policies, e.g., some kinds of regulations of rights (as in Laguno¤, 2001) or speci…c kinds of public spending over which preferences diverge. This would be particularly relevant if the model were extended to allow for group heterogeneity in preferences, creating a role for fractionalization and polarization.
Second, the turnover probability could be made endogenous by allowing the incumbent to choose whether to repress opposition groups.
8 Shocks to repression costs would then provide another in ‡uence on political instability as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) . Third, the model does not allow for any means of disciplining incumbents beyond changing institutions. Thus, it rules out links between political turnover and incumbent policy choices. In a model with some form of accountability, incumbent groups could develop reputations which make policies more cohesive. Except in extreme cases, however, this would not fully replace the role of institutional constraints.
Fourth, a natural extension of the model would be to allow for costs of changing institutions. The "ink and paper" costs of changing a constitution are probably not signi…cant. The appropriate foundations for costs beyond ink and paper are not self-evident. Perhaps constitutional reforms create stickiness by facilitating changes in informal institutions, changing inertial norms of behavior in the political system. Changes in norms might best be thought of as a further state variable, similar to what Persson and Tabellini (2009) call "democratic capital". Institutional choices would then be conditioned on this state variable. More generally, sources of state dependence that imply costs of institutional change would make an incumbent group weigh these costs against the bene…ts of reform, which could create a status-quo bias. Practically, this would result in t+1 becoming a function of the institutions in place t . Partly to re ‡ect such concerns, we will allow for state dependence in our empirical approach below.
Fifth, and …nally, as mentioned in the introduction, reforms are defensive and anticipate the possibility of a group losing power. However, they do not change the probability that a group remains in o¢ ce. To introduce the latter is another natural extension of the approach and in Section 6 we take a step in this direction by modeling the openness of access to power such as a widening of the franchise. That section also presents empirical results, which suggest that -contrary to the reforms of executive constraints -this other aspect of political reform is not strongly correlated with our two measures of leader resilience. econometric structure that re ‡ects the predictions of the model.
Measurement
Political institutions Our core measure of cohesive political institutions is derived from the executive-constraints variable in the Polity IV data, "xconst". It is available for a large number of countries over a long period of time, essentially since becoming an independent state (or from the start of the data, in 1800). This variable takes on integer values between 1 and 7. As our core measure, we use a binary indicator i;t which is equal to one if country i has a score which is greater than or equal to 5 on this 7 point scale in year t.
We use this cuto¤ for two reasons. First, plotting the empirical distribution of scores over countries and years, has a distribution with a local minimum at 4. Second, according to the Polity IV codebook, a value of 5 is the lowest at which there are "substantial limitations of executive power", where a "legislature or council often modi…es or defeats executive proposals", or "sometimes refused funds to the executive", and "the accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts" -see Marshall and Jaggers (2010, pp. 24-25) . Using this classi…cation, we have 171 reforms in an unbalanced panel of 167 countries with annual observations since 1875. This is the measure that was used to construct Figure 1 . The robustness analysis to follow shows that we get similar results when marginally altering the cuto¤ for the binary indicator.
Leaders Since we do not observe turnover between groups in a large enough group of countries for a long enough time, we instead focus on leader turnover, i.e., exits of leaders from o¢ ce. We use several data sources for this purpose. The core data set is Archigos (Goemans, Gledtisch and Chiozza, 2009) that documents which leaders are in o¢ ce at which dates. We highlight a particular subset of leadership transitions, following the death or serious illness of the incumbent leader. Here, we exploit data from , who extend the sample of Jones and Olken (2005) with years before the second world war. The main biographical sources are the Encyclopedia of Heads of States and Governments (Lentz, 1994 (Lentz, , 1999 ) and the Encyclopedia Britannica.
We also measure a number of other personal characteristics of leaders, including their education, occupation, social class, and their mode of entry in power. Education and occupation come from Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011). The sources of the social class and mode of entry variables are given in the Data Appendix.
Resilience In the empirical application, we measure leader resilience in two ways. The …rst is an ex post measure based on whether a leader survives to leave o¢ ce only due to natural death (or serious illness). Since 1875, 217 leaders -out of a total of 2095 -left o¢ ce in this way. 9 The rest of the leaders leave o¢ ce for other reasons, due to electoral defeats, coups, or assassinations. Since the leaders who die in o¢ ce have much longer tenure than other leaders, we regard the ability to survive until a natural death as a …xed leader characteristic which proxies for resilience. For the purposes of our analysis it does not matter whether a leader who dies from natural causes in o¢ ces is resilient because he or she is deemed to be especially competent or because s/he has an e¤ective means of maintaining o¢ ce through a powerful personal network. Our …rst measure of resilience is thus a binary indicator in country i , p i;t 1 , which is equal to one if the leader that holds o¢ ce at the beginning of year t is someone who will eventually die in o¢ ce, and zero otherwise. This indicator is positively related to r i;t 1 in the model. In the following, we refer to this measure as "personal resilience".
The second measure of leader resilience relies on circumstances of the leader's tenure due to unforeseen events. Speci…cally, we use rely on recent natural disasters during the leader's tenure in o¢ ce. The underlying idea is that citizens'crave political stability and continuity in the wake of such disasters, the so-called rally-round-the- ‡ag e¤ect. That citizens rally around leaders in times of national stress is a well-known idea in political science, discussed for example in Kinsella, Russett and Star (2012, page 120). While there is some debate about the basis of this e¤ect -whether a deep-seated psychological response of citizens or rational-choice based need to maintain stability in tough times; the exact interpretation does not matter for our analysis. They key thing that we need for the approach to work is that there is a strong enough empirical relationship between the incidence of natural disasters and political stability. Our data on natural disasters measure comes from the EM-DAT data set. Speci…cally, we de…ne a variable that adds together the number of such events in a given country and year. 10 We believe that these events are material enough in all cases to have a¤ected signi…cant fractions of the population. Having created the number of events, we create a dummy variable which is equal to one if there is any disaster in a given country and year denoted as f i;t . We will work with lagged values speci…cally f i;t 1 and f i;t 2 which we refer to as "rallying-around-the- ‡ag resilience" or " ‡ag resilience" for shirt. We postulate that these variables are positively related to r i;t 1 in the model. Table 1 presents some summary statistics for the period 1875 to 2004. Six columns compare mean outcomes (by country-year) in the strong and weak executive constraints samples. We will also break it down according to whether leaders die from natural causes in o¢ ce, our proxy for personal resilience.
Summary statistics
Row (1) shows that among 13380 country-years for which we have leader data, around two thirds feature weak executive constraints. Row (2) shows that there are more personally resilient leaders in weak-executive constraints country-years. Rows (3) and (4) show that personally leaders on average su¤er fewer natural disasters during their term in o¢ ce. Moreover, row (5) shows that turnover is lower under weak executive constraints. As these di¤erences indicate some unobserved characteristics across the two sub-samples, this is one reason (due to the possibility of state dependence) why we divide the sample according to the initial value of executive constraints throughout the empirical analysis.
A striking fact in row (6) is that countries with personally leaders have longer tenure, something which is particularly pronounced in countries with weak-executive constraints. Tenure is thirteen years on average for personally resilient leaders compared to eight years for personally non-resilient leaders. This strongly motivates using death in o¢ ce from natural causes as a proxy for resilience. Row (7) shows that there is no marked di¤erence between strong and weak executive constraints or between leaders who are personally resilient and those who are not in terms of the age at which leaders come to power. The longer tenure of leaders who die in o¢ ce means that they will on average be older making it important to control for age and tenure when looking at whether the process of institutional change is di¤erent when a personally resilient leader is in power.
Rows (8) through (12) consider educational attainment. Although there is little di¤erence between strong and weak executive constraints, it does look as if personally resilient leaders are on the whole less educated. In fact, this is the case regardless of educational category. This motivates why we present results below that control for the educational attainment of the leaders.
Although (13)). Rows (14) through (18) suggest little in the way of occupational di¤erentiation between leaders depending on whether or not they are personally resilient. As expected, row (19) shows that personally resilient leaders are more likely to be monarchs. Moreover, monarchs are more common with weak executive constraints.
Our next measures look at indicators of social class, which -following a common approach in sociology -is measured by the occupation of the leader's father. Speci…cally, we use a four-way classi…cation to indicate the class of the leader, ranging from "underclass" to "upper class" in rows (20) through (23) . These too show little di¤erence across institutions and whether a leader is personally resilient.
Next, we look at the mode of entry into o¢ ce. As row (24) shows, personally resilient leaders are less likely to have been elected than non-resilient ones. Row (25) shows that personally resilient leaders are more likely to be selected by hereditary succession. But there is no di¤erence (row (26)), in terms of whether they came into power in a (post-) colonial transition. There also appears to be no di¤erence in terms of their being selected through autocratic means, via some oligarchical group as a military junta (row 27)).
Finally, inspecting the country characteristics in rows (28)- (38), there is strong evidence that the history of executive constraints is correlated with contemporary constraints. However, this history does not have any marked correlation with the likelihood that a country has personally resilient leaders. As expected, strong executive constraint countries are richer (relative to the US) than their weak executive-constraint counterparts. But there is little di¤erence in income depending on whether the leader personally resilient, at least under weak executive constraints. Finally, the distribution across geographic regions is reasonably similar across countries in terms of whether or not leaders are personally resilient.
Econometric speci…cation
Referring to Proposition 1, we do not know how to empirically measure e in the theory. However, we can postulate that this multiplicative variable has some distribution, with c.d.f. F . The speci…c timing comes from the theory -institutional transitions ( i;t+1 ) take place in period t in response to ex-ante expected (group and leader) turnover (Q t ) in that period, which in turn depends on resilience, as determined by the type of leader and the type of circumstances (natural disaster or not) inherited from the previous period (r i;t 1 ):
Suppose then that country i has a leader with resilience r i;t 1 entering period t. Then, the model predicts a reduced-form relation, where the conditional probability (likelihood) of observing strong executive constraints in that country in the next period is given by:
: r i;t 1 = 1 F (Q (r i;t 1 )) :
Observe that this is decreasing in , i.e., a group with a leader of higher resilience has a lower probability of introducing strong executive constraints. This suggests running a regression:
where i ; t and country and year e¤ects and the control vector A i;t contains other characteristics of the leader in o¢ ce in country i at date t; or (time-varying) characteristics of country i. We expect < 0, i.e. a resilient leader implies a negative e¤ect on the reform probability. This reduced form is made up from two "structural equations":
where Q ( ) is given by (1) . In words, the probability of a reform towards strong executive constraints, P i;t , is a function of the probability that the incumbent group is replaced; this, in turn, depends on the leader's resilience at t 1. Thus, to estimate both equations we need separate characteristics of the leader or of circumstances that correlate with resilience and have no direct e¤ect on reform.
Let q i;t be the probability that the leader in place l in country i at date t leaves o¢ ce. 11 We
where q i ; q t ; i ; t are country and year e¤ects. 12 We will estimate this system to identify parameters ; 1 ; 2 and by instrumental variables with three instruments for turnover: whether the country had a leader with personal resilience, p i;t 1 , or ‡ag resilience in any of the two past periods, f i;t 1 and f i;t 2 . 13 We expect > 0 and 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 in the turnover equation, and we expect > 0 when in weak executive constraints. The exclusion restriction is thus that our proxies for resilience do not have any direct e¤ect on institutional reform, an assumption that we will scrutinize in the next section.
When estimating the standard errors " i;t ; i;t ; we exploit two approaches. One is to cluster at the country level, allowing for arbitrary correlations over time. Alternatively, we cluster at the regional level (10 regions), allowing for arbitrary correlations over time and within regions.
Resilience and Executive Constraints
We begin this section by presenting our baseline regressions results on the relation between leader resilience and reforms of executive constraints. Then we discuss their robustness.
Baseline results
The baseline results are contained in Table 2 . The table reports two sets of standard errors: in round parentheses are those that cluster at the country level, allowing for arbitrary correlations over time while in square brackets we cluster at the regional level (10 regions), allowing for arbitrary correlations over time and within regions.
The …rst three columns are for country-years under strong executive constraints. Here, we control only for year and country …xed e¤ects as well as the log of the leader's age at entry and the log of the leader's tenure. These same variables are included in all the subsequent regressions.
The reduced-form result in Column (1) shows no signi…cant correlation between personally resilient leaders and transitions from strong to weak executive constraints. However, having a 11 The sample of leaders comes from Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011). In years with multiple leaders in o¢ ce, we focus on the leader who has been the longest in o¢ ce. Thus, a leader who lasts only 2 or 3 months is not included. 12 To diminish the collinearity of age and tenure, we measure a leader's age only at his entry to power. 13 While the IV-approach ‡ows naturally from the theory, it is worth pointing out that it may not deliver unbiased results in the wake of heterogenous e¤ects. The reason is analogous to the familiar LATE point, emphasized by Heckman (1990) and Angrist and Imbens (1994) : the personal exits from o¢ ce and the natural disasters used to identify our instrumental variables estimates induce a speci…c subset of changes in political instability.
natural disaster in the previous period does seem to increase the probability of a transition to low executive constraints. Column (2) indicates a signi…cant correlation, negative as expected, between personal resilience and the probability of turnover. This corresponds to parameter in the …rst-stage equation (4) in our IV-approach. Likewise, having a recent natural disaster reduces the probability of turnover, i.e. 1 < 0 and 2 < 0. This is evidence of a robust rallying-aroundthe- ‡ag e¤ect in the data. However, our estimate of parameter in the second-stage equation (5) in Column (3) shows no signi…cant correlation between turnover and a transition from strong to weak executive constraints.
Columns (4) through (6) look at the same issues for transitions from weak to strong executive constraints. Here, the reduced-form in Column (4), shows a precisely estimated negative correlation between personal resilience and the introduction of strong executive constraints. Likewise, rallying-around-the- ‡ag resilience reduces the probability of a transition. With a personally resilient leader in place, the likelihood of such reform per year is 1 percentage point lower than with a non-resilient leader, while the e¤ect of a natural disaster is around 1.5-2 percentage points. These are large e¤ects, given the reform activity which took place over the period of our data. To see this, note that there were 88 reforms towards strong executive constraints in our 6,486 country-year observations from 1875 to 2004 -i.e., the unconditional probability of reform is about 0.013%. Our estimated coe¢ cients are thus on the same order of magnitude as this unconditional probability.
The IV-estimates in Columns (5) and (6) unpack this reduced-form e¤ect. Personal resilience raises expected turnover by a around percentage points per year, or by 40% of its average value (0.1 as reported in Row (2) of Table 1 ). As in column (2), ‡ag resilience reduces turnover. In fact the results in columns (2) and (4) look quite qualitatively similar. The F-statistic on the excluded instruments is over 14, indicating that the instruments are not weak.
Column (6) shows that an increase in expected turnover signi…cantly raises the probability of a reform that introduces strong executive constraints, in line with the theory. The estimated coe¢ cient is quite precisely estimated. Since we have three instruments for one endogenous variable, we can also carry out an over-identi…cation test of (two of) the instruments not being correlated with the residuals from the second-stage regression. The Sargan-Hansen statistic, with a p-value of 0.96, indicates that we are very far from rejecting this hypothesis. 14 In all of the columns in Table 2 , the results that we …nd are robust to either method of clustering; indeed they are almost identical. Hence, for the remainder of the paper, we report only standard errors which cluster at the country level.
Taken together, the results in Table 2 are consistent with a structural interpretation of the evidence in line with our model. A country with weak executive constraints which is ruled by a leader with greater resilience -due to personal characteristics or circumstance -is less likely to introduce strong executive constraints, an e¤ect which is mediated through lower expected turnover.
Robustness
In this subsection, we explore the robustness of the baseline …ndings in Table 2 , focusing exclusively on the case when we condition on initially having low executive constraints. We will …rst look at the sensitivity of the results to the exact choice of instrument. Then, we test whether the results are robust to personal characteristics of the leader, and to economic and political conditions. We also break the estimation sample into sub-periods, and change the de…nition of 14 This statistic is given by N R 2 ; where N is the number of observations and R 2 is computed by regressing the residuals in the second stage of the IV-speci…cation on the excluded instruments. It is distributed as chi-2, with (since we have three instruments) two degrees of freedom. the dependent variable, by varying the cuto¤ used to divide the sample into strong and weak executive constraints. The results from these robustness checks appear in Tables 3-6 . Table 3 explores the robustness of our IV results by varying the choice of the instruments. In columns (1)- (3), we use only the personal resilience of the leader. The estimates are very similar to the corresponding speci…cations in columns (4)-(6) of Table 2 . In column (4), we add the two ‡ag-resilience variables to the second stage (and the …rst stage). Reassuringly, turnover remains positive and signi…cant with a similar magnitude to that in column (3), as well as that in column (6) of Table 2 . The ‡ag-resilience variables themselves are not signi…cant, which adds credence to our assumed exclusion restriction. In an analogous exercise, columns (5)- (7) use only the ‡ag-resilience variables as instruments. Again, the estimates are similar to those in columns (4)-(6) in Table 2 . Moreover, the magnitude of the turnover coe¢ cient in column (7) is very similar to that in column (3). Finally in column (8), we add personal resilience to the second (and …rst) stage. This variable is insigni…cant and does not alter the estimated turnover coe¢ cient. The fact that we obtain the same result on how turnover a¤ects executive-constraints reform with very di¤erent instruments for resilience considerably raises the credibility of these estimates. We conclude from this table the our core result does not hinge on choosing a speci…c (set of) instrument(s).
Choice of instruments
Leader characteristics and income
The validity of our instrumental-variable estimates hinges on the exclusion restriction that having greater leader resilience a¤ects institutional reform only through expected turnover. This identifying assumption would be questionable if there were systematic changes in the characteristics of individuals who are selected as leaders following the death (or entry) of personally resilient leaders, if di¤erent leaders with di¤erent characteristics have different propensities to implement reform. Similarly, it would be problematic if natural disasters were to trigger large changes in the country's relative income with the resultant economic malaise making reforms towards high executive constraints less likely. Table 4 explores these issues.
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 4 focus on the personal resilience of the leader as an instrument, and adds leader characteristics as controls. Speci…cally, we include educational quali…cations (…ve categories), occupational background (eight categories), and social class (four categories). The choice of these characteristics re ‡ects data availability where we have been able to collect data for a long enough time period. Their means are given in Table 1 . Re-estimating the speci…cations in columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 with these additional controls, we …nd reduced-form and IV-estimates of a similar magnitude. 15 Columns (4)- (6) focus instead on the ‡ag-resilience instruments for turnover, as measured by recent natural disasters. They show the speci…cations parallel to those in columns (5)- (7) in Table  3 , while also controlling for the country's GDP level relative to the US (from the Maddison data set). The estimates are more or less identical to those in Table 3 .
Finally, in columns (7)- (9), we include both the leader characteristics and the relative GDP together with the full set of instruments. In this case, the natural point of comparison is columns (4)-(6) of Table 2. The results from Table 2 remain robust, with the IV coe¢ cient on turnover is even a little larger than before. Table 5 includes two additional sets of variables to check if our results are robust to political context and political history. In columns (1)- (3), we add categorical variables for the mode of entry of the current leader. Speci…cally, whether the leader was elected, inherited his/her position, was imposed on the country by a colonial power, or entered in some other way. If these are systematically di¤erent for resilient and non-resilient leaders, and di¤erent entry modes are associated with di¤erent likelihoods of reform, this would call the IV-estimates into question. However, the pattern of reduced-form and …rst-stage IV coe¢ cients are very close to their values in earlier tables. The second-stage IV estimate of expected turnover on reform remains strongly signi…cant and has a similar magnitude as in Table 2 .
Political context
Resilient and non-resilient leaders could conceivably enter at di¤erent points in a country's political history. Speci…cally, suppose that personally resilient leaders are more likely to appear early on, when the country has little or no experience with strong executive constraints, and that such experience promotes future reforms into this regime. This channel -in the spirit of Persson and Tabellini's (2009) analysis of democratic capital -could violate the exclusion restriction and bias the 2nd-stage IV-estimate upwards. However, including the proportion of years with strong executive constraints in a country's history in columns (4)- (6), along with the mode of entry, suggests that this is not the case. Again, the estimates are almost identical to the baseline estimates in Table 2 . Table 6 columns (1)- (6) display the results when we estimate the baseline speci…cation, while splitting the sample before and after World War II. The smaller samples naturally tend to increase the standard errors. Nonetheless, we …nd that our core results hold up in both sub-samples. Indeed, the reduced-form, …rst-stage and second-stage IV results are very similar in both sub-samples to the baseline results in columns (4)- (6) in Table 2 .
Estimation period
Measuring executive constraints Finally, columns (7)- (9) of Table 6 use a di¤erent de…nition of high executive constraints with a less demanding cuto¤ (a value of 4 rather than 5 on the 7-point scale for the "xconst" variable). Once again, the results from Table 2 remain robust. In particular, the estimated IV-coe¢ cient on turnover in Column (9) is also precisely estimated and of similar magnitude to that in Table 2 .
Summary Overall, the …ndings in Tables 3 through 6 suggest that the baseline results in Table  2 are robust. First they are consistent with a key part of the theoretical mechanism which conjectures that there is a negative e¤ect of leader resilience on expected political turnover. Both of measures proxies for resilience -whether a leader survives to die in o¢ ce or experiences natural disasters during their tenure -reduce turnover. Second, they allow us to use an instrumental variables approach where we …nd that expected turnover has an e¤ect on the probability of transition to strong executive constraints. The e¤ect seems robust to both dimensions of instrumentation that we use -using either a leader characteristic or country circumstance to think about sources of resilience. The robustness of the …ndings to a range of country and leader controls makes it more compelling to interpret the empirical results through the lens of our theoretical model. The e¤ect is not only statistically robust, but quantitatively signi…cant: when a resilient leader is not replaced after having died in o¢ ce, the annual probability of reform towards strong executive constraints doubles.
Leader Resilience and Openness
Our theoretical approach is speci…c to institutional change in the form of executive constraints and we have therefore maintained a focus on this in the empirical analysis. A good deal of the political economics literature on reform to date, in particular Robinson (2000, 2006) , has focused on the determinants of franchise extension. 16 In our framework, we can think about such an extension as a reform that makes access to power more open and contestable. In this section, we show that leader resilience does not have a clear-cut theoretical prediction for the reforms towards greater openness. Moreover, there is no distinct pattern in the data. Hence, in line with what we expect from the approach, it is speci…c to a particular dimension of institutional change.
Modeling openness
We extend the previous model, allowing incumbents to choose the degree of openness for recruitment to o¢ ce next period. This a¤ects political stability as it decreases the chance that any particular group will hold onto power. We also add a cost of holding on to power when institutions are not fully open.
Speci…cally, suppose 2 [0; 1] is a choice variable that a¤ects openness, where = 1 means complete openness (free and fair elections) and = 0 complete closedness (e.g., leaders are only picked from a small, entrenched elite such as in monarchy). Let (r; ) denote the probability that a group whose leader has resilience r survives as the incumbent, and assume that is increasing in r and that < 0 and < 0; i.e. a more open system reduces the probability that an leader survives. Let ( ) be the expected survival value when a new leader is chosen at random. Keeping o¢ ce recruitment closed, < 1; has a cost -e.g., because it requires spending on security or repressing other groups to avoid the risk of a revolution or a coup. For simplicity, this cost is linear in and given by [1 ] c. As before, a within-period political shock t determines if the incumbent leader survives as the leader of his group. Before the realization of this shock, the ex ante (unconditional) probability that the incumbent group survives in power is given by
The revised timing of the model is:
1. The polity starts period t with an an incumbent group I t and its leader with resilience r t 1 , and inherited institutions, f t ; t g ; where t binds for that period.
2. The incumbent leader chooses policy fg t ; s t ; b t g for the current period, and political institutions, f t+1 ; t+1 g:
3. Nature determines period-t political stability shock t . If the leader survives, then his resilience remains the same. If not, a fresh draw determines r t .
4. Group I t is replaced in power with probability 1 r t ; t+1 : Each opposition group has an equal probability of taking over the executive, namely
Choice of openness We begin by studying the case when is …xed but the incumbent can choose the level of openness t+1 . In this situation, we can look at how the resilience of the incumbent group's leader a¤ects the degree of openness in the next period. The optimal choice of solves:
(r) = arg max Q(r; )
where V K ( ) is the value of entering next period with group status K = I; O and a given value of : There is a trade-o¤ between staying in power in future against the costs of repression. The key observation is that
; and that this gap is decreasing in : The …rst-order condition for openness, assuming an interior solution, is:
How openness depends on shocks to the resilience of the incumbent group's leader is ambiguous and depends on how such shocks a¤ect the marginal gain from greater openness. That is, it depends on the sign of Q r ; which is a priori unclear. For example, if Q r > 0, then resilience and openness are complements, i.e. d =dr > 0. So having a more resilient leader leaving o¢ ce will tend to reduce openness. This makes sense since having a leader who is more likely to stay in power means that the incumbent group can reduce repression costs by making the political system more open. This ambiguity in the e¤ect of r on openness is consistent with existing theories of franchise extension which have tended to focus on shocks to repression costs -c in our model -to motivate increased openness. This, for example, is the approach taken to modeling franchise extension in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) . In our model, an increase in c would tend to increase openness unambiguously. The key point to take away from our analysis is that there is no clear-cut theoretical link between the resilience of leaders, in the sense that we have speci…ed, and the decision to increase openness.
Evidence In Table 7 , we re-estimate the core speci…cations from Table 2 , but with a di¤erent dependent variable. Speci…cally, we replace the indicator for high executive constraints with three di¤erent indicators for open elections. We have de…ned reforms of electoral institutions by drawing on a variety of data sets. From Polity IV, we use two measures. One is designed to capture the extent to which the chief executive is elected through competitive multi-party elections -the "Executive recruitment" variable. Another is designed to capture whether executive recruitment takes place in a setting where no signi…cant group or groups are regularly excluded from the political process (the "Political Competition" variable). As an alternative variable to capture open contests for power, we use an indicator of the breadth of the franchise from Przeworski (2009), which provides data on su¤rage rules for 187 countries between 1919 and 2000. More details on these variables, including precise de…nitions, can be found in the Appendix.
The nine columns of Table 7 show reduced-form, …rst-stage and second-stage IV results for these three di¤erent measures. To test that our previous results do not capture simultaneous reforms of di¤erent dimensions of political institutions, we continue to condition on having weak executive constraints to begin with. As columns (2), (5) and (8) show, a robust …rst stage remains in all cases. However, looking at Columns (1), (4) and (7), we …nd no-reduced form correlation between increases in openness and having a resilient leader in o¢ ce. When we estimate the second stage of the IV, we thus …nd no robust association between turnover and electoral openness using any of our three outcome measures.
In addition to the speci…cations reported here, we have tried a large number of alternatives, using the subcomponents of the Polity IV measures, di¤erent cuto¤s to de…ne open elections, and alternative data sets such as the one by Cheibub et al (2010) . 17 In no case, do we …nd a signi…cant relation between resilient leaders and open elections.
This …nding is important in dispelling the idea that we are capturing a generic "democratization e¤ect" due to increases in turnover; there is no particular theoretical reason to expect such an e¤ect and the data do not suggest it either. More generally, the …ndings here con…rm the importance of speci…city in studying political change beyond aggregate democracy measures. Most importantly for this paper, it gives credence to the notion that the mechanism behind political reform is the one suggested by our core theory.
Concluding Comments
Understanding the forces behind institutional change is a signi…cant challenge in political economics. While the prevalence of strong executive constraints has increased over time, we are not aware of any previous research which develops and tests a speci…c hypothesis about the driver of this speci…c dimension of reform. From a theoretical perspective, leaders with a stronghold on power have much weaker motives to reform. Empirically, we …nd that such resilient leaders are less likely to adopt strong executive constraints, a …nding which is robust to a number of di¤erent speci…cations and inclusion of a variety of controls. As we have seen, this e¤ect is quantitatively important.
Our paper has two novel empirical aspects. First, we exploit data on death of leaders from natural causes in a di¤erent way than previous studies, such as Jones and Olken (2005) . Indeed this calls into question the idea to view the death of a leader is a "natural experiment". We think of a leader's death in o¢ ce as a prospective source of variation in leader resilience, rather than as a random "event". However, as we have shown, this interpretation yields consistent empirical …ndings. The basic idea is that leaders who manage to stay on until the grim reaper forces them from power are di¤erent, in view of their much longer tenure. That does not imply that leader death does not create dislocation (for good or ill) as earlier researchers have argued. However, dying leaders may behave di¤erently throughout their tenure, as a consequence of being more resilient. Whichever way one looks at it, leaders and their personal characteristics do matter for political and economic outcomes.
Second, we have tested and expolited the much conjectured "rally-round-the- ‡ag e¤ect". We …nd that leaders who hold o¢ ce when natural disasters hit are more likely to survive. This is an interesting …nding in its own right. However, in the context of our paper it provides an alternative source of exogenous variation in leader resilience, which we can use to explore our proposed theoretical mechanism.
We have independently studied reforms of executive constraints and electoral institutions, but only found an e¤ect of leader resilience on the former. However, an interesting idea for future research is to model explicitly the interplay between electoral openness and executive constraints. Our framework implies a complementarity between stronger executive constraints and greater openness, since openness increases the prospect of a leader leaving o¢ ce, all else equal. 18 This logic suggests a possible sequencing of institutional reforms, where shocks to expected turnover may initially lead to stronger executive constraints and then to franchise extension. It is interesting that England, the showcase in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) , introduced constraints on executive 18 In terms of our model, a general approach would allow both institutional dimensions and to be chosen. There are good reasons to expect a complementarity between stronger executive constraints and greater openness. This can be seen clearly in equations (6) and (7) . Stronger executive constraints narrow V I ( ) V O ( ) ; the gap between the values of incumbency and opposition, and hence encourage greater openness, all else equal (since Q < 0). Intuitively, as the incumbency-opposition gap diminishes, it becomes less worthwhile to incur the costs of maintaining a closed system of executive recruitment. In the limiting case of full cohesiveness, it is never worthwhile to reduce openness.
(royal) power -through reforms such as Magna Carta and the Glorious Revolution -long before the universal franchise.
Our paper has homed in on a speci…c aspect of institutional change, as a result of strategic and forward-looking behavior. We are not claiming that a model as simple as ours can capture the full range of complex narratives behind times of reform, as should be clear from the rich narrative of Spain after Franco that we developed above. However, the simple theory suggests an empirical regularity, which also appears in the data. Thus the theory helps us link together what would otherwise appear to be a range of isolated experiences. More generally, the paper emphasizes the need to look at di¤erent aspects of institutions rather than studying aggregate democracy scores. However, it is clear that much more needs to be done to explore the sequencing of reforms and complementarities between speci…c constellations of political institutions.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
As a provisional step, it is useful to de…ne the indirect utility from public and private goods for the incumbent elite and other groups:
where
and
Let V K ( ; r) be the stationary value of arriving in any period when institutions are and the leader has resilience r where K = I denotes being the incumbent and K = O denotes opposition. Now de…ne:
To prove Proposition 1, we want to solve:
Observe that:
Using the envelope theorem:
, so we only need to compare = 0 and = 1 e (1 e) in this case. Moreover, given the recursive structure, we have
Solving this condition, gives the inequality stated in Proposition 1. Suppose instead that e > Q (r),
Moreover, this implies that e > Q (r) so that
Using the recursive structure, we get
for all 2 h 0;
. Thus,^ (r) = Social Class: A variable that has value a value between 1 and 4 based on the father's job. The description of the 4 levels classi…cation for the social status comes from Ludwig (2002) . A value of 1 corresponds to Under-stratum (e.g., unable to keep job, bankrupt, imprisoned, enslaved, disabled, unsteady or seasonal employment, …nancially dependent on others, etc.). A value of 2 is a Lower-stratum (i.e., work for others without possessing special skills or professional training [e.g., peasants, laborers, seamstresses, blue collar workers, minor civil servants, etc.; work for self without many resources or employees [e.g., small farmer, vendor, small businessman, etc. ]); A value of 3 is Middle-stratum ([i.e., special education, training, abilities required] (a) professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, scientists, bankers, business persons, teachers, ministers, and minor politicians, (b) professional creative artists (painters, musicians, writers, actors) (c)business persons or landowners with employees; A value of 4 corresponds to Upper-stratum ([i.e., established wealth, power or social status [e.g., the movers and shakers of society; aristocracy; landed gentry; moguls, upper crust, leaders of nations, major tribes, or political parties, etc.]) We look for leader's father job using the following sources: Lentz. (1994 Lentz. ( , 1999 ; Britannica Online Encyclopedia, Academic Edition (http://www.britannica.com/); The Statesman's Yearbook Online (http://www.statesmansyearbook.com/about.html); Barcelona Center for International A¤airs' Political Leaders Biographies (CIDOB) (http://www.cidob.org/en/documentation/); and other online sources, as well as individual biographies from Lexis-Nexis. Occupational dummy variables are from Military: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was in the military, before holding o¢ ce. Lawyer: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was a Lawyer, before holding o¢ ce. Civil Servant: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was a Civil Servant, before holding o¢ ce.
Professor or Scientist: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was a Professor or Scientist, before holding o¢ ce.
Unskilled Worker: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was an Unskilled Worker, before holding o¢ ce.
Business: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was in business immediately before holding o¢ ce.
Monarch: A dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader is or has been part of the monarchy.
Mode of entry: Elected: A dummy that is equal to one if the leader was elected to o¢ ce in the …rst instance. Hereditary: A dummy that is equal to one if the leader was selected by hereditary succession Colonial: A dummy that is equal to one if the leader was colonial/transition selected Other autocratic modes of entry: A dummy that is equal to one if the leader was selected/appointed by an oligarchy/junta, selected by constitutional succession or by in a military coup.
Sources: Lentz. (1994 Lentz. ( , 1999 ; Britannica Online Encyclopedia, Academic Edition (http://www.britannica The Statesman's Yearbook Online (http://www.statesmansyearbook.com/about.html); Barcelona Center for International A¤airs'Political Leaders Biographies (CIDOB) (http://www.cidob.org/en/documen and other online sources, as well as individual biographies from Lexis-Nexis.
Electoral Institutions To obtain a comparable sample across countries and time to the core results, we …rst look at two summary indexes in the Polity IV data for executive recruitment and political competition, called "exrec" and "polcomp". The Executive Recruitment index has scores between 1 and 8. According to the Polity IV codebook, it is only for a score of 8 that the "chief executive (de facto head of government) is chosen through competitive elections matching two or more candidates from at least two major parties ... the electoral process is transparent and its outcomes are institutionally uncertain" -see Marshall and Jaggers (2010, pp. 64). We therefore de…ne a baseline binary variable for enfranchised institutions, which is one if the "exrec" score is equal to 8 and zero otherwise. Using this baseline variable, our panel has 154 reforms since 1875. But we also try di¤erent, less demanding cuto¤ values.
The Political Competition score is coded between 1 and 10. By the codebook, only a score of 10 captures "Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political in ‡uence with little use of coercion. No signi…cant or substantial groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process." -see Marshall and Jaggers (2010, pp. 85). Following this coding, we de…ne an alternative baseline binary variable for enfranchised institutions, which is equal to one if the "polcomp" score is equal to 10 and zero otherwise. This way, we obtain 50 reforms since 1875. Again, we try alternative cuto¤ scores.
Since these alternative Polity IV variables do not perfectly capture extensions of the franchise, we also exploit data from other sources. Przeworski (2009) provides data on su¤rage rules for 187 countries from 1919 until 2000, which relies on detailed regional information. A necessary condition for a franchise extension is that elections are held at least once and Przeworski (2009) dates the changes of su¤rage rules by the time of the …rst election under the new rules (not when electoral law was passed). He maps the su¤rage (for males) onto a seven-category scale, where a level of 1 means that the franchise permits only estate representation, while a level of 7 means that it excludes only individuals below some minimum age, possibly combined with a residence requirement. Based on these data, we construct a binary indicator which is equal to one when a country has reached level 7 of franchise extension and zero otherwise.
Figure 1 Worldwide Prevalence of Strong Executive Constraints, 1874-2004
Notes: The figure shows how the shares of countries in our data that have high executive constraints, according to the binary measure we define in Section 3, develop over time. The blue curve shows the prevalence for the 50 countries for which we have data from start to end, while the red curve shows the prevalence for all countries for which we have data in a given year. (3) and (7)- (9), education of the current leader is measured by five categories (post-graduate, college, high-school or corresponding, elementary school, no formal education), occupation in 8 categories (military, lawyer, professor-scientist, business, civil servant, unskilled, manual worker, other), and social class of father in 4 categories (upper/elite, middle, lower, under). Income in columns (4)- (9) is measured by the country's PPP adjusted GDP per capita relative to the US in the current year. All regressions also include log tenure of the leader, age of the leader at entry, as well as fixed country and fixed year effects. The sample is for the period 1875-2004. (6) refers to how the current leader entered office measured by four categories (elected, inherited, colonial transition, other autocratic modes of entry). Past constraints in columns (4)-(6) refers to the proportion of years in the past (since 1800 or independence), in which the country had High executive constraints. All regressions also include log tenure of the leader, age of the leader at entry, as well as fixed country and fixed year effects. The sample is for the period 1875-2004. Notes: The dependent variables are indicators for either strong executive constraints or turnover, as indicated. These are defined in the text of Section 4 and the Data appendix. In columns (7)- (9), the boundary between strong and weak executive constraints is (weakly) greater than 4, rather than 5, on the 7-degree scale for "xconst". Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Asterisks refer to: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. All regressions also include log tenure of the leader, age of the leader at entry, as well as fixed country and fixed year effects. Sample period varies, as indicated. 
